Reve\{a,i\}ling the risks: a phenomenology of information security by Pieters, Wolter
 1
 
 
 
 
Reve{a,i}ling the risks: 
a phenomenology of information security 
 
 
Wolter Pieters 
University of Twente 
 
Originally submitted version. Accepted for publication in Techné. 
 
Abstract: 
In information security research, perceived security usually has a negative meaning, 
when it is used in contrast to actual security. From a phenomenological perspective, 
however, perceived security is all we have. In this paper, we develop a 
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electronic voting controversy in the Netherlands. 
 
 
Keywords: electronic voting, information security, phenomenology, risk, trust 
 
Acknowledgements: 
The research described here was partly performed while the author was employed at 
the Radboud University Nijmegen and supported by a Pionier grant from NWO, the 
Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research. This text is based on parts of the 
author’s PhD thesis (Pieters, 2008). The author wishes to thank (in alphabetical 
order) Luca Consoli and Sanne van der Ven for useful comments on drafts of this 
paper. 
 
 2
Introduction 
 
Information security is an increasingly important area of research. More and more 
sensitive data is entered into information systems, such as votes, health records and 
travel behaviour of electronic public transport cards as well as cars. In many 
countries, controversies exist on the security of such systems. Whereas 
manufacturers claim that their systems are secure, hackers seem to find all kinds of 
vulnerabilities, and scientists and politicians either support the manufacturers or the 
hackers. The question we ask here is how such dynamics can be analysed from a 
philosophical perspective. 
 
There is some agreement in the analysis of information security about the need for 
covering both technical and social aspects of security (Evans and Paul, 2004; 
Nikander and Karvonen, 2001; Oostveen and Van den Besselaar, 2004; Riedl, 2004; 
Xenakis and Macintosh, 2005). The social aspects are often labelled “trust”. It is then 
said that trust is based on “perceived security”, rather than “actual security”. The 
reasoning can be summarised as follows. “Actual security” can be assessed by 
technical experts, and “perceived security” is a more or less distorted version of this 
in the mind of a member of the non-technical community. From this point of view, 
trust is based on “perceived security”, as opposed to “actual security”. It can easily 
be determined to be either justified or unjustified depending on the agreement 
between the perceived and actual security of the system.1
 
Such a view appears to be intuitive, and provides for business a clear division of 
responsibilities between the technical department and the marketing department: the 
technical department is responsible for actual security, the marketing department for 
perceived security. However, it is not satisfactory in scientific analysis of security 
controversies. The distinction between actual and perceived risk has been subject to 
criticism in the literature, because there is no method to separate actual risks from 
perceived risks (Jasanoff, 1998; Hansson, 2004; 2005). This is in line with other 
results in philosophy of science, which argue that facts are constructions rather than 
states of the world independent of experience. Risk, instead, should be seen as 
constructed. Since security can be thought of as absence of certain types of risk, the 
same holds for security. The precise meaning of “construction” can vary according to 
the philosophical perspective taken. 
 
This article provides an alternative vocabulary for discussing information security 
controversies from the point of view that risks are emergent from the relation 
between humans and the environment, which is a phenomenological perspective. 
We will make use of terminology from Luhmann’s system theory as well.2 The 
controversy on electronic voting, especially in the Netherlands, will serve as running 
example.  
 
First of all, the controversy on electronic voting is introduced, as well as its 
problematic explanation in terms of actual security and perceived security. We will 
then argue that an alternative explanation should take into account that risks are 
always selected. Then, we will introduce the philosophical concept of “entbergen” 
due to Heidegger. Using this concept, we will argue that selection involves 
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“revealing” risks, but that this means at the same time a “reveiling” of other risks. 
Drawing further upon the work of Heidegger, we will try to distil the specific way in 
which these risks are dealt with from a cultural perspective, and what this means for 
information security and electronic voting in particular. This will lead us to 
conclusions on the use of the phenomenological terminology in the context of risk. 
 
Electronic voting 
 
In the Netherlands, electronic voting (e-voting) machines have been introduced in 
the election process since the early nineties, without much discussion about their 
security. It was not regarded a serious problem that the design was secret, and only 
the independent voting system licenser TNO knew the details. Most of the concern 
was about whether all citizens would be able to operate the machines. After their 
introduction and the implementation of requirements in the law, the system became 
a background phenomenon in which people had confidence. Only in 2006, 
controversy emerged about the security of the machines, after the same thing 
happening in many other countries earlier. By that time, paper voting had become 
the exception. 
 
The Dutch debate was due to a group of people launching a campaign against the 
use of the machines. The anti-e-voting pressure group was set up after the founders 
experienced e-voting for the first time themselves, in Amsterdam. These people 
argued that “unverifiable” voting systems should be abandoned, which they thought 
applied to all e-voting systems. They managed to get hold of a couple of voting 
machines, and took them apart, demonstrating security problems both with the 
correctness of the results and the secrecy of the vote (Gonggrijp et al., 2006). The 
demonstration included replacing the counting program with a fraudulent one, and 
eavesdropping on the voter’s choice by means of radio signals. This initiated major 
attention of the media and the government. Eventually, the pressure group 
succeeded in making electronic voting machines disappear from the Dutch scene. 
 
The e-voting controversy has been analysed in terms of actual and perceived 
security. It is then usually taken to mean that in paper voting, actual security can 
easily be observed, whereas it cannot in electronic voting. Hans Geser (2004) finds 
that in traditional systems, “all the documents and devices which could potentially be 
subject to manipulation (voter registries, voting papers, ballot urns, handwritten 
signatures, etc.) exist in physical form, which makes them amenable to objective 
visibility and unimpeded examination." (p. 91) Xenakis and Macintosh (2005) argue 
that “[s]ince procedural security is evident and understandable to voters, it has a 
comparative advantage when it comes to developing and supporting the social 
acceptance for the new e-processes". In case of procedural security (measures 
requiring human intervention, as opposed to technical security), the actual security of 
the system can apparently be perceived by the voters, such that trust can easily be 
established and justified, because perceived and actual security coincide.3 In case of 
electronic voting, it takes experts to show to the unknowing public the actual 
(in)security of the electronic systems, thereby invalidating the public’s trust in the 
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systems, which was based on perceived security rather than actual security. 
 
From this perspective, it is easy to explain why the Dutch anti-e-voting campaign 
was successful: they were right. The only thing they did was replacing perceived 
security with actual security, thereby demonstrating that paper voting is actually 
more secure than electronic voting. This explanation is not satisfactory from a 
philosophical point of view, though, because it assumes the actual security of both 
paper voting and electronic voting as a priori, rather than accounting for their 
construction. For why is paper “evident and understandable”? This is itself something 
that requires explanation. If anything, this is a matter of degree rather than a 
fundamental difference: paper is understandable because people have been 
educated in processing paper, and this education may be easier than education on 
the workings of computers (if scientists have figured this out at all). The introduction 
of what we now think of as “normal” paper voting raised major issues in the United 
Kingdom (Asquith, 1888; Park, 1931). 
 
The problem with such an analysis, therefore, is that it does not account for why 
certain claims are acknowledged the status of facts (actual security) and others are 
not. Woolgar and Pawluch (1985) have termed the drawing of arbitrary boundaries 
between facts and claims “ontological gerrymandering”, analogous to the drawing of 
arbitrary boundaries between electoral districts to the advantage of the ruling party. 
According to these authors, there can be no such thing as objective underlying 
conditions if one wants to explain controversies, precisely because controversies 
question which claims deserve the status of fact. 
 
Moreover, arguing that paper votes can be more easily perceived invalidates the 
argument that perceived security is something bad that should be banned from 
voting processes, and replaced with actual security. If there is a truth about voting, 
this actual security will certainly be known through perception, but perception is used 
as at the same time as a deceiving opposite of actuality. We want to perceive 
because then we can know, but if we know then we should not perceive. Is, 
consequently, perceived security something that should be replaced by actual 
security, or is perceived security precisely what we need? 
 
Providing a deeper explanation of why the anti-e-voting campaign in the Netherlands 
was successful is therefore necessary, and will be the final goal of the 
phenomenological argument presented here.  
 
Risk assessment as selection 
 
In order to analyse information security from a philosophical point of view, we first 
need an understanding of what it is that information security experts study, and how 
this relates to the concept of risk. Information security is the field of research that 
deals with modelling the security properties and security risks of information 
systems. Security, as opposed to safety, describes measures to protect the system 
against deliberate attacks, not unintentional failures. Unintentional breakdown of 
computer systems is therefore not part of information security, but hacking is. 
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Typically, goals of security measures include confidentiality, integrity and availability 
of information. In order to study the protection of these properties by an information 
system, security experts need an attacker model that describes the capabilities of an 
enemy trying to disrupt the confidentiality, integrity or availability of information. The 
capabilities of the attacker correspond to potential risks that could affect the security 
of the system if it were not designed properly.  
 
It has been shown many times that the attacker models of security experts can be 
incomplete. For example, a security protocol for electronic authentication was proven 
correct with respect to generally accepted security models, but an attack was found 
many years later (Lowe, 1996). The inherent limitation of security verification is 
widely recognised by computer scientists. One can never know what an attacker will 
be up to in the future, and one can never know whether confidentiality, integrity and 
availability cover all possible risks. Therefore, studying the security risks of 
information systems inherently involves more uncertainty than scientific knowledge in 
general. Instead of describing risk analysis in terms of measuring actual security, 
one should focus precisely on this uncertainty to understand security controversies. 
This can be achieved by addressing the problem of risk selection. 
 
Risk, according to Niklas Luhmann ([1993] 2005, 21-22), is uncertainty in relation to 
future loss, attributable to a decision. Luhmann contrasts the concept with danger, 
which is not attributable to a decision. If a river floods once every ten years and this 
is accepted as a fact, it constitutes danger. If it floods after it was considered to build 
dikes, it constitutes risk. Which possible losses are included in a decision depends 
on the perspective of the decision maker. Luhmann thus frames the question on 
knowing the risks as a question of selection: 
 
“[Social science research] brings to the foreground the question of who or what 
decides whether (and within which material and temporal contexts) a risk is to be 
taken into account or not. The already familiar discussions on risk calculation, risk 
perception, risk assessment and risk acceptance are now joined by the issue of 
selecting the risks to be considered or ignored.” (p. 4)4
 
Rather than being a problem of representation, therefore, security assessment can 
be considered a problem of selection: selection of what needs to be protected and 
selection of how this can be threatened. Instead of representing security assessment 
as a way to measure actual security, we will ask the question how risks are selected. 
However, in order to avoid the pitfalls of the actual/perceived distinction, we should 
not think of this selection as a matter of picking something that is already there. 
Neither is it a purely social construction independent from the environment, for we 
may perceive losses even if we did not select the particular event as a risk. We 
therefore choose a phenomenological approach, which promises to give an account 
from the interrelation of humans and their environment. How can we describe this 
selection process from a phenomenological point of view? 
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Heidegger’s concept of “entbergen” 
 
To provide a vocabulary to explain risk selection, a particular concept due to the 
German philosopher Martin Heidegger can be very useful. This section is necessarily 
only a sketch of the features of Heidegger’s thought that are relevant for the aim of 
this article: using a specific Heideggerian concept in a phenomenological approach 
to risk controversies. The use of Heideggerian terminology is thus pragmatic rather 
than orthodox. 
 
As all phenomenologists, Martin Heidegger (1889 – 1976) took a specific position 
between realism and idealism: it is from the inevitable relation between the subject 
and the object (“Verklammerung”) that things appear to the human mind; there is no 
primacy for either the subject or the object. This means that there is an active part in 
perception, but the content is not determined by the subject completely. Rather, the 
subject must bring the beings into being by revealing them in a specific way. It is in 
this specific context that Heidegger introduces the concept of “entbergen” 
(Heidegger, 1982; Tijmes, 1992; Verbeek, 2005). 
 
“Entbergen” means bringing something from concealment into unconcealment (“aus 
der Verborgenheit in die Unverborgenheit bringen”). It is a concept of truth (Greek: 
aletheia) that has something active in it. In English, it is usually translated as 
revealing. One of the most famous (and notorious) ways in which Heidegger uses 
the concept is in the analysis of technology. Heidegger sees the essence of 
technology as a specific way of revealing the world, namely as a set of resources 
(something that was ordered: “bestellt”, “herausgefordert”, a “Bestand”). This view on 
technology is now widely disputed and claimed to be too essentialist (Verbeek, 
2005). Still, the fact that technology (and also specific technologies) makes us see 
the world in a particular way is generally recognised. The problem with Heidegger’s 
interpretation is that it seems to allow for one way of “entbergen” at a time. A more 
modest claim is that a cultural framework, including available technologies, invites 
revealing the world in a certain way. Such a weaker claim can be defended from 
both pragmatist and system theoretic points of view, which is beyond the scope of 
this paper. 
 
At the same time that something is brought from concealment into unconcealment, 
something is also being “reveiled”. This intentional misspelling indicates that in the 
process of revealing, the process itself and the original concealment are being 
concealed. This connotation is also present in the original German term “entbergen”: 
“verbergen” means to hide. The human mind clings onto the things that have been 
revealed rather than the fact that these things came from concealment, and that 
other things are even more concealed after the act of revealing others. 
 
Heidegger’s ideas have later been taken up by philosophers of technology (Ihde, 
1990; Verbeek, 2005). Although these “postphenomenologists” have a far less 
radical view on the changing potential of technology, they acknowledge - more than 
Heidegger did - the mediating character of concrete technologies, from telescope to 
hotel key, in our experience and actions. The idea that aspects of reality can be 
amplified or reduced by technological means is a central theme within this 
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movement. It is from this postphenomenological tradition that we polish up the 
concept of “entbergen” for use in the information age. 
 
Reve{a/i}ling the risks 
 
When discussing risk selection, we have to deal precisely with the intricacies of 
avoiding both the interpretation as selecting something that is already there and the 
interpretation as selecting something independently from the environment. We 
therefore argue that the process of selecting the risks can be understood as a 
process of “entbergen”. Risks are not purely socially constructed phenomena, but 
they do not represent an objective nature either. They are revealed from 
concealment, and the particular mode of “entbergen” determines which risks become 
visible (and how) and which do not. 
 
This is not to say that there is only one way of “entbergen” possible given the 
technological constitution of our society, as Heidegger himself seemed to imply. It is 
precisely the history of things that have already been revealed, which is culture-
specific (and even subculture-specific), that influences the characteristics of the 
process of “entbergen”. That which has already been revealed mediates the process 
of revealing other beings. It may both invite and inhibit the revealing of certain risks 
(cf. Verbeek, 2005). 
 
Moreover, revealing certain risks hides the process of revealing, and thereby the 
risks that were not revealed. These risks can be said to be reveiled in the process of 
“entbergen”. Thus, when we have done a risk assessment, not only have we 
revealed certain risks, but the risks that we did not reveal may have been even more 
reveiled in concealment than they already were. On the other hand, revealing certain 
risks may also invite revealing other, similar, risks. 
 
For example, if climate change has been revealed as a major risk of energy 
consumption, fossil fuels become less attractive, and biofuels may get into focus. At 
this point, because the climate change risk has been revealed, other risks may be 
reveiled and receive less attention. In such a context, it is no wonder that risks of 
biofuels, such as competition for soil with food supply, are overlooked at first. 
 
In security, as opposed to safety, the process of revealing is not only mediated by 
security experts, but also by the intruders or attackers. The assessment of which 
features of a system are risks is a continuous process of “negotiation” between the 
attackers and the defenders. When an attacker reveals a risk, the reply by the 
defenders (a defence against the attack) makes the risk even more visible. It may 
also work the other way round: a risk that is revealed by a security expert may be 
even more revealed if it is exploited by an attacker. 
 
For example, when we have revealed so-called buffer overflows as a major cause of 
security vulnerabilities in computer programs, other vulnerabilities may become more 
concealed. This is due to both attackers and security experts focusing on what has 
already been revealed (the buffer overflow vulnerability), trying to exploit and remedy 
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this problem, respectively. On the other hand, risks that are similar to or instances of 
buffer overflows are more likely to be revealed once the buffer overflow has become 
common knowledge. 
 
This yields a meaningful distinction between “perceived risk” and “non-perceived 
risk”, or “revealed risk” and “reveiled risk”, replacing the distinction between “actual 
risk” and “perceived risk”. Perceived risk is risk that has been revealed, and now 
takes on a positive meaning, as opposed to the negative meaning it has in relation to 
actual risk. 
 
As argued above, different cultures may reveal risks in different ways. We can 
understand this from the perspective of the distinctions that are used in the culture to 
describe the world. Such distinctions or cultural categories are our means of dividing 
the world into different types of objects (Smits, 2002; 2006). Animals may be 
categorised as mammals, reptiles, birds, fish, et cetera. Information systems may be 
categorised as hardware and software, programs and data. Cultural categories may 
also exist for subcultures within a society, for example industry, academia and 
activists. The level of analysis will depend on the distinctions that we are interested 
in. 
 
From the perspectives of different sets of cultural categories, a new technology may 
be categorised differently, and also the risks will be revealed differently. For 
example, the risks of genetic modification will be revealed differently from the 
perspective of human health than from the perspective of ecology. Sometimes this 
does not cause major problems when a new technology is introduced, but it may 
also lead to controversy. If we cannot agree on the relevant categories, we may have 
to adapt our categories to find a common way of revealing the risks.  
  
Once agreement on the risks and countermeasures has been established, the risks 
of technology may be reveiled once more. Some risks that were revealed in the early 
controversy on a new technology have been taken care of, others have been 
forgotten, and may re-appear later. This process of reveiling brings things back from 
unconcealment into concealment, by “undoing” the process of revealing. Later, risks 
may be revealed again, for example in case of an incident or an active campaign 
against the technology, but they need not be the same anymore. 
 
We argued that the existing distinction between “actual security" and “perceived 
security", on the latter of which trust is supposed to be based, is problematic. We can 
now rehabilitate the term perceived security. Security measures, implemented to 
protect against revealed risks, are reveiled together with the risks once agreement 
has been reached, and they become invisible. Also, when certain risks were never 
explicitly thought of but accidentally addressed by the design of the technology, there 
may be invisible security measures. We thus have “revealed security” and “reveiled 
security”, complementary to “revealed risk” and “reveiled risk”. Here, we have a more 
meaningful distinction than between “perceived security” and “actual security”. Risks 
and security measures that have been “forgotten” (both in the sense of never thought 
of and in the sense of thought of but not remembered) can re-appear in the future, 
and thus the concept of “reveiled security” can contribute to the analysis of 
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controversies. 
 
Risk assessment as ordering 
 
According to Heidegger, modern society does not reveal things in a way that 
corresponds to the old Greek “technè”, which he sees as a form of “entbergen”. 
“Technè” was creating things in a craftsman’s way, things that do not appear by 
themselves. Instead, the modern technological society orders (“bestellt”) the world: it 
forces things to appear. The world is constituted as a set of resources. “Entbergen” 
has become a forcing into unconcealment. 
 
Although this analysis can be rejected for being too abstract, massive and nostalgic 
(Verbeek, 2005), it offers some profitable insights in the use of risks in modern 
society. When applied to risk, the analysis states that modern society forces the risks 
into unconcealment. This seems to be quite an appropriate expression for what 
happens in risk assessment. We do not wait until something goes wrong; we want to 
know beforehand what can go wrong, how likely that is and how severe the 
consequences are. 
 
“Ordering” means both asking for something and structuring the contents of it. In this 
way, “ordering” risks means both requiring the technology to show its risks and 
structuring these risks at the same time. Thus, “ordering” the risks is both ordering in 
the sense of asking for, and in the sense of structuring. The first meaning is 
expressed in the goals of risk assessment, namely forcing the risks into 
unconcealment; the second meaning is expressed in the way the result is presented: 
as a list of risks associated with probabilities and costs.  
 
Thus, following Heidegger just far enough in his sceptical view on modern society, 
we see that modern society tends to reveal risks by “ordering” them. We find that risk 
assessment can be described as “ordering” the risks into unconcealment, by 
revealing them with “force”. This ordering is both a demand and a quest for structure. 
The ordering may hide the process of revealing and the original concealment, which 
leaves the scientist no other choice than to claim that she has found a “real” threat, 
which, in case of information security, is called actual security. Or, in more pragmatic 
terms, the scientist (or activist!) does not have the tools to describe her discovery in 
a different way. This may explain why the distinction between actual and perceived 
security is prevalent in analyses of information security controversies. 
 
Confidence and trust 
 
Thus far, we have achieved two main results. Firstly, based on the use of the 
concept of “entbergen”, we have rehabilitated the notion of perceived security. 
Perceived security should not be understood as opposed to actual security, but as 
opposed to non-perceived or reveiled security. Secondly, we have analysed how it 
can be explained that this approach is often overlooked, and why both activists and 
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scientists demonstrate their findings in terms of actual security (and designate the 
previous, uninformed state as “perceived security”). We will now proceed to redefine 
a concept that was seen as derived from perceived security: the concept of trust. 
 
Trust is a form of self-assurance. It entails reliance upon something else, and the 
belief that this other will not fail in meeting certain expectations. Technology is 
acceptable if we trust it to have limited unwanted effects. However, the grounds on 
which self-assurance is based can be quite different. In earlier work, I used Niklas 
Luhmann’s distinction between confidence and trust (Luhmann, 1988) to disentangle 
the discussion on the relations between security and trust (Pieters, 2006). 
 
Confidence, following Luhmann, is taken to mean self-assurance of the safety or 
security of a system without knowing the risks or considering alternatives. Trust 
means self-assurance by assessment of risks and alternatives. A technology can be 
said to be reliable if it is suitable for acquiring confidence. It can be said to be 
trustworthy if it is suitable for acquiring trust. A technology that operates successfully 
may acquire confidence, but it may become problematic when subjected to 
comparative analysis, and therefore fail to acquire trust. In information security, a 
proprietary security mechanism - such as in the Mifare classic chipcard - may 
acquire confidence, but since it cannot be publicly analysed, it may not be 
trustworthy. 
 
We can now be more precise about the relation between confidence and trust. 
“Ordering” the risks denotes a transition from confidence to trust. Trust in this setting 
means self-assurance based on knowledge (i.e. unconcealment) of risks and 
alternatives; confidence means self-assurance without such knowledge. By forcing 
the risks into unconcealment, one can exchange confidence (or a lack thereof) for 
(dis)trust. However, this also means that the concealment, the process of revealing 
and thereby the original confidence are hidden.5 Rather than a replacement of 
perceived security with actual security, what often happens in a controversy is a 
replacement of confidence with trust or distrust: more risks are being revealed, and 
decisions between alternatives are taken accordingly. 
 
Electronic voting revisited 
 
Provided with the conceptual tools developed in the previous sections, we now turn 
our attention to a phenomenological analysis of the electronic voting controversy in 
the Netherlands. 
 
In the Netherlands, the paper voting system had effectively reveiled the risks of 
proxy voting (voting by authorising someone else). Ten to twenty percent of the 
votes cast in an election are typically cast by someone else than the voter. The risk 
of vote buying or coercion, and the accompanying security measure of the voting 
booth, had apparently been reveiled. Only after the OSCE revealed this risk again, 
discussion re-emerged (OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, 
2007a). Once buying and coercion have disappeared as a profound risk in elections, 
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partly due to security measures, they can be “forgotten" in the introduction of a new 
technology, such as Internet voting, where a voting booth is not possible. In the 
Netherlands, they seem to have been revealed again, whereas in the UK, they are 
not so much seen as substantial risks (Pieters and Van Haren, 2007). Apart from this 
problem, most risks of paper voting remained reveiled for a long time. 
 
Because of its short history, agreement on the risks of e-voting is far less strong. The 
risks of e-voting, therefore, can only be a reveiled by now if they are able to hide 
within the existing system. This has happened in the Netherlands. Security 
measures that were reveiled in the paper system, e.g. in terms of verifiability, 
continued to be hidden when the transformation towards e-voting took place. The 
possibility of a recount completely changed in e-voting compared to paper voting, but 
this security measure remained reveiled, together with the risk it was meant to 
address – discussion about the count. When risks are revealed anew, which the 
pressure group encouraged, the notion of verifiability may be associated with major 
risks in e-voting. 
 
Many security measures in the paper voting system have been reveiled by now (why 
a voting booth, why recounts, why paper in the first place), together with the risks in 
elections that made them appear. This explains why the paper voting system 
appears as less risky than new electronic systems. Paper voting does not appear as 
less risky because it is actually more secure, but because the risks and security 
measures have been reveiled. This, however, may also mean that risks are 
overlooked when e-voting is first implemented. E-voting, until 2006, was able to rely 
on the reveiled security of the paper voting system. However, the activist group 
made sure that this was no longer possible. They “ordered” the risks. 
 
Following the line of argument set out in this text, the most important reason for the 
smooth introduction was that the electronic systems were not seen as alternatives to 
the existing procedures, but rather as automated versions of existing procedures. 
This made it easy to transfer confidence from paper voting to the new systems, 
without revealing new risks. 
 
After the introduction, the public became sensitive to computer security issues due to 
media coverage of Internet security problems such as viruses and worms. This 
revealed new categories of risks in computer systems, which led to revealing new 
risks of voting systems as well. Accordingly, opposition to electronic voting ensued in 
countries such as the United States and Ireland. In the Netherlands, some criticism 
appeared, but the scene remained relatively silent, possibly due to soothing remarks 
by the highly trusted Dutch government. After 2006, however, the pressure group 
created in their arguments a clear distinction between paper voting on the one hand 
and electronic voting on the other: they were said to be fundamentally different.  
 
If electronic voting is seen as a really different alternative to paper voting, which the 
pressure group encouraged, people suddenly get the option to decide on a voting 
system. This invites actively revealing the risks of the different systems, and basing 
the decision on an analysis of these risks. This means that trust now becomes the 
dominant form of assurance, as opposed to confidence. This has as a consequence 
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that voting systems are required to be trustworthy rather than reliable only. 
 
By making the distinction between paper voting and e-voting, the pressure group 
thus created a set of alternatives, requiring a decision, and changing the 
expectations from reliability to trustworthiness. This, again, led to the traditional 
paper system becoming more attractive, because it is based on human procedures. 
Human procedures more easily acquire trust than automated procedures, for 
humans generally have more experience with and knowledge of the former. On the 
other hand, if the new technologies are not seen as an alternative, but as an 
improvement of existing procedures, electronic devices are more attractive, because 
they are more reliable and thus more easily acquire confidence. The risks are then 
reveiled. 
 
The two main (new) risks that the pressure group revealed in their media offensive 
were the ease of replacing the chips with counting software, and radiation leaking 
information about the voter’s choice. Apparently these were not problems that were 
addressed by the testing criteria of the law: they had been reveiled in the original 
discussion. This can be explained by a focus both on verification of the design by 
testing authorities rather than verification of results by election observers, and on 
secrecy of the ballot in storing the voter’s choice rather than in casting the vote. Why 
this particular revealing took place at the time is an interesting empirical question 
from the phenomenological perspective sketched here. 
 
After the demonstrations of the pressure group, the only thing in the law to build 
upon was the demand of the secret ballot, which was apparently violated by the 
radiation problem. The Minister decertified about 10% of the machines for this 
reason: not because of failure to meet the criteria laid down in lower legislation, but 
because of possible problems with the orderly conduct of the elections. Therefore, 
the selection of this risk now makes it impossible to introduce voting machines in the 
Netherlands that do not meet radiation requirements, effectively banning electronic 
voting from the country. In other jurisdictions, the radiation issue has not been 
revealed as a major risk. 
 
Meanwhile, the original problem the campaign tried to address, the lack of 
verifiability, had been reveiled by the focus of the Ministry and the media on the 
radiation risk. The pressure group had a hard time getting this back on the agenda. 
The campaign people had “ordered” the risks, but what they got was not exactly 
what they asked for, because they revealed particular risks in a particular way, 
thereby inviting the revealing by others of similar risks (the government had the 
intelligence service look into the radiation problem, causing more revealing on this 
topic), and reveiling their basic argument. Meanwhile, by making paper voting and 
electronic voting distinguished alternatives, they transformed the original confidence, 
based on the concealment of risks, into distrust. We now want trust in e-voting 
systems, not just confidence. This also put an end to the experiment with Internet 
voting: because of the risks revealed, not only the particular Internet voting in place 
showed some deficiencies, but probably any Internet voting system would have been 
deemed too risky. 
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Conclusions 
 
In this paper, we used Heidegger’s notion of “entbergen” to explain how risks of 
technological systems are revealed and reveiled in risk controversies. Our point of 
departure was the assumption that risks are neither purely objective nor purely 
subjective. Based on the use of phenomenological terminology, we discussed how 
risk controversies can be understood in terms of the revealing and reveiling of risks 
and security measures, rather than in terms of actual and perceived security. We 
linked these concepts to the distinction between confidence and trust and analysed 
the Dutch e-voting controversy from this perspective. 
 
In general, risks and security measures of paper voting will be reveiled by the time 
electronic voting is proposed. Which risks will be revealed will determine which 
security measures are put in place in e-voting. If the voting system functions 
properly, people will have confidence in it without exactly knowing how it works or 
considering alternatives. When problems arise and e-voting and paper voting are 
compared as alternatives based on risk assessment, risks are revealed (again) and 
trust (or distrust!) takes the place of confidence. Such dynamics of reveiling and 
revealing can be analysed in similar controversies as well. 
 
One of the main benefits of our analysis is a better understanding of the relation 
between the revealing of certain risks and the concealing (reveiling) of others. This is 
hard to account for in a representational view of risk assessment. Moreover, the 
concept of “entbergen” can be used as a clarification of the distinction between 
confidence and trust proposed earlier. 
 
Apart from information security, the terminology developed may also apply to other 
risk-related areas. For example, environmental risks may be revealed differently 
when the focus is on climate change than when the focus is on acid rain. Again, the 
media play an important part in the dynamics of revealing and reveiling. Also, if risks 
are revealed as described in this article, drawing up laws and requirements for 
technological systems is part of the process of revealing and reveiling risks. This 
means that the law, in the end, will reflect the process of revealing, which can be an 
interesting area for further (empirical) research. 
  
Instead of contrasting the concepts of actual and perceived security in risk 
controversies, we should emphasize the distinction between revealed and reveiled 
security. This allows for a much richer analysis of the dynamics of the debates. The 
main disadvantage seems to be the essentialist connotation that Heideggerian terms 
mostly have. We hope we have made clear that we do not share such a view, but we 
understand that it must be revealed as a risk of this approach. 
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1  In this paradigm, “actual" refers to what is scientifically assessable. In this context, it is interesting 
to remember the distinction between the things in themselves and our observations of them as 
proposed by Kant. Here, the things in themselves (noumena) are not accessible by science, 
because science is based on observation. The phenomena, the things as observed by us, are the 
scientifically relevant aspect. The things in themselves (the “actual" things) are the domain of 
metaphysics, not science. In a way, the relation of “actual" to science has been reversed when 
compared to Kant's philosophy. 
2  This is more than just a pragmatic combination of theories. Phenomenology and systems theory 
have been combined in an analysis of information technology by Fernando Ilharco (2002). In 
Social Systems, Luhmann himself refers to the phenomenological theory and method repeatedly 
(Luhmann, 1995). Both discuss phenomena “from the inside”. 
3  There is a remarkable resemblance here to Descartes conceiving certain ideas as “clear and 
distinct". It is supposed, in both cases, that there are certain things that are understandable by just 
common sense, as opposed to derived or expert knowledge. These things can be directly 
extracted from experience, such that “perceived" and “actual" coincide.  
4 Interestingly, Latour (2004) uses the same phrase “taking into account” in his solution to the 
representational versus social constructionist issue. 
5 Confidence, self-assurance without knowing risks or alternatives, corresponds to concealment. 
Trust corresponds to unconcealment. By revealing the risks by means of ordering, confidence is 
concealed, and even seems to be unnecessary, or dangerous. Luhmann (1988) warns for a 
society that relies too much upon trust and neglects the amount of confidence that is necessary for 
participating in a complex society at all. 
